On
Monday June 18, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Williams v. Illinois that further
clarified how to treat forensic evidence under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause. Under the Confrontation
Clause, a defendant has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” In 2004, the Court issued Crawford v. Washington and held that the
Confrontation Clause forbids the prosecution from introducing hearsay
statements that are “testimonial” unless the person who made those statements
is called to the stand. Hearsay
statements are statements made out of court that are introduced to prove the
matter asserted.
The
four Justice plurality concluded that this evidence was not admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted, and therefore would not violate the Confrontation
Clause. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Alito concluded that the evidence was more akin to a series of
hypothetical facts that an expert could base an opinion on, but that the fact
finder did not have to accept as true in order to evaluate that opinion.
However,
there were only four Justices who agreed with this rationale. Justice Thomas wrote a separate
concurrence, agreeing with the plurality only in judgment. Instead, Justice
Thomas agreed with the dissenters that “[there is no meaningful distinction
between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that a factfinder may evaluate
the expert’s opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth.”
The
most interesting part of this decision, however, is the differing treatment the
Justices give to potentially “testimonial” statements. The dissent held with the decisions
since Crawford and stated that the
report was testimonial. In Hammon v. Indiana, the Court found that if
the primary purpose of the hearsay was to “establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to a criminal prosecution,” it was testimonial and barred
by Crawford. The dissent followed this rationale in
its opinion and concluded that the report in this case was testimonial.
Justice
Alito’s plurality found that the report was not testimonial, as the report was
not prepared to accuse any particular individual of a crime. In fact, the plurality found, the DNA
profile was more likely to exonerate the person whose DNA sample was provided
unless that person was rapist.
This rationale, that to be testimonial the hearsay must be directed at a
particular person, was used by these same four Justices in previous dissents to
Confrontation Clause cases.
Justice
Thomas ultimately concurred in judgment with the plurality, stating that the
admission of the information from the report through an expert was not barred
by the Confrontation Clause. While
the plurality based their opinion in part on whether the information qualified
as hearsay, Justice Thomas found that the information contained in the report––and
the report itself––was not testimonial because it was not solemn or formal
enough. Justice Thomas found that
in order to be solemn or formal enough to establish hearsay as testimonial, the
hearsay must be uttered or prepared under traditional settings such as formal
interrogations, formal reports, or previous testimony.
This
rationale was previously cited in a dissent to a Confrontation Clause case; in Hammon, the Court’s other eight justices
rejected this reasoning. Yet, Justice Thomas’ concurrence is more narrowly
written than the plurality’s opinion.
Because of this, Justice Thomas’ concurrence is the binding
opinion.
After
this fractured opinion, what will come next for the Confrontation Clause? Five Justices appear to question the
rationale in Hammon, even if the
plurality cited to it as binding precedent in a footnote. While these five Justices do not agree
on what standard should be applied when deciding if hearsay is testimonial, the
door has been opened. This will
not be the last case on the definition of “testimonial.”
Bonnie
Lindemann
Blogger,
Criminal Law Brief
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