The
“Twinkie defense” refers to a diminished capacity defense, in which a criminal
defendant argues that he did not have the requisite state of mind at the time
of his crime to be held accountable because of some mental defect or
abnormality. This defense was made
famous in 1979, when an official in San Francisco entered the city hall and
murdered both the mayor and another city official.[1]
In that case, the defendant claimed a
mental defect that caused a depression to form and manifest in an inability to
resist eating junk food.[2]
Nearly
fifty years after that famous defense, the Supreme Court will hear a case involving
the diminished capacity defense, and efforts to ban its use. Burt Lancaster was charged for first-degree
murder in 1993 in connection with the death of his girlfriend. Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer,
had a long history of mental illness. In
1994, he admitted at his jury trial that he had killed her, but insisted he had
been legally insane or suffered from diminished capacity at the time. Despite the defendant’s claims, the jury
found him guilty. Following a reversal
of his conviction based on problems with jury selection, Lancaster received a
second trial in 2005. For this trial, he
waived his right to a jury and instead elected to have a bench trial,
presumably because he felt he had a better chance getting the judge to look at
the intricacies of the law than a jury.
Prior
to Lancaster’s second trial, the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the statute[3]
that allows defendants to present an insanity defense.[4] That statute also allowed for a defendant to
assert the diminished capacity defense.
The theory of such a defense is that “if because of mental disease or
defect a defendant cannot form the specific state of mind required as an
essential element of a crime, he may be convicted only of a lower grade of that
offense not requiring that particular mental element.”[5] In People
v. Carpenter,[6]
the Michigan Supreme Court held that diminished capacity was not permitted
under the statutory framework for an insanity defense, even though that statute[7]
had been enacted in 1975.
At
Lancaster’s second trial, the trial judge decided that Carpenter applied retroactively; so even though Lancaster was
allowed to present diminished capacity as a defense in his first trial, he was
no longer allowed to do so in this trial.
Being denied this defense, the defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison. Upon
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court overturned[8]
his conviction in 2012, finding that Lancaster was denied due process of law
because he was not allowed to present the diminished capacity defense.
Because
Lancaster appealed under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act[9],
the court could only overturn the conviction upon finding that the trial
court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court has
certainly agreed that basic due process requires that statutes give fair
warning of conduct that will be a crime.
This is generally established precedent that is not particularly
controversial. When a state court
unexpectedly overrules a consistent line of decisions in criminal law, then
applies that decision retroactively, this will deprive the defendant of due
process.
The
problem is that in this case, the statute in question never specifically
addressed the defense of diminished capacity.
In fact, the legislature had never addressed diminished capacity, and
the Michigan Supreme Court had also never confirmed that it was an acceptable
defense. However, it had been common
practice to allow the defense to be asserted at the trial court level. The appellate courts had in some cases even affirmed
that diminished capacity is a legitimate defense available to the
defendant. Because of this, the
diminished capacity defense has never been as firmly ingrained in the fabric of
the criminal justice system as if it had been established by the legislature,
or confirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.
So did the Michigan Supreme Court change substantive law when it found
that defendants could not assert diminished capacity defenses? Or did it simply finally decide murky area of
law that a defendant should have reasonably foreseen could be changed?
For
the Sixth Circuit[10] at
least, the Michigan Supreme Court changed substantive law. In its opinion[11],
the Sixth Circuit notes that diminished capacity had been asserted as a defense
in Michigan since 1973. Subsequently,
the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the statutory framework for the
insanity defense included the diminished capacity defense. As such, according to the Sixth Circuit, the
statute enacted in 1975 did not substantially change the recognition of
diminished capacity as a defense to criminal prosecution. The Michigan Court of Appeals, in fact,
continued to issue opinions concerning and upholding the use of diminished
capacity as a defense through when Lancaster killed his girlfriend in
1993. Because of these factors,
including the Michigan Supreme Court’s implicit recognition of the defense, the
Sixth Circuit found[12]
that diminished capacity was a consistent line of cases.
The Sixth Circuit next considered whether the decision in Carpenter should have been foreseeable. The Sixth Circuit found[13] that because the Michigan Court of Appeals had so consistently applied the diminished capacity test without a response from the Michigan Supreme Court, the defendant could not have foreseen that the defense would be overturned by the time he had his second trial.
Because
the Sixth Circuit found all of these things, it also clearly found[14]
that the trial court’s decision that Carpenter
applies retroactively was an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent.
This seems clearly substantiated if you accept the Sixth Circuit’s
argument. However, while there was a
long history of application of the diminished capacity defense, that defense
was never as clearly established as the Sixth Circuit claims it must have
been. The Michigan Supreme Court never
confirmed that the defense was proper.
The legislature never passed a statute that directly established
diminished capacity as a legitimate defense.
While not clearly erroneous, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion[15]
is made far less persuasive than had one of these factors been in place. That said, in this current Supreme Court
climate, wherein the Court is understandably wary of applying decisions
retroactively, it is hard to argue that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion will be
overturned when it is reviewed later this year.
Bonnie
Lindemann
Blogger,
The Criminal Law Brief
No comments:
Post a Comment