Following
the subprime mortgage meltdown, an issue
repeatedly raised by commentators and the public at large is the Administration’s
lack of prosecutions of high-ranking members of the financial sector. The key question seems to be whether the
government will be able to hold any of the major players in America’s financial
institutions responsible for a financial crisis cause in part by reckless
lending and excessive risk taking by major financial institutions. 60 Minutes did an excellent report on the
topic in December 2011 that you can watch here.
More
recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) have taken enforcement actions that have targeted some big names in the
financial industry.
In
February 2012, the SEC charged four former Credit Suisse Group investment
bankers and traders for engaging in a scheme to fraudulently overstate the
prices of $3 billion in subprime bonds at the height of the subprime credit
crisis. In a press release, the
SEC alleges that the traders priced subprime bonds in a way that enabled Credit
Suisse “to achieve fictional profits.”
Moreover, the SEC also alleges that the traders mispriced bond prices to
hit daily and monthly profit targets, which was driven, in part, by “these
investment bankers’ desire for lavish year-end bonuses.” The case is currently pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Likewise,
the DOJ has been busy. Recent press
articles report that the DOJ is investigating possible fraud at General
Electric Company’s former subprime mortgage Unit, WMC Mortgage
Corporation. The DOJ and FBI are
investigating whether senior managers condoned practices that enabled
fraudulent loans to be sold to investors during the height of real estate
boom. Specifically, unidentified sources
state that government is investigating whether WMC used falsified paperwork,
and overstated borrowers income, among other acts, to push through questionable
loans.
The
public’s demand for more enforcement actions related to the subprime mortgage
crisis is unlikely to abate any time soon.
The difficulty of successfully prosecuting a financial case should not
be underestimated. The authors of “Observations on the Dearth of Criminal
Prosecutions After the Financial Meltdown” provide a useful analysis of
the challenges prosecutors face. The
authors discuss U.S. v. Ferguson
where the SEC successfully charged and convicted Wall Street executives for
securities fraud only to have the case thrown out of federal appeals
court. The authors draw a few lessons
from Ferguson. They argue there is a general consensus
that “prosecutors face an uphill battle, while defense attorneys’ jobs have
gotten slightly easier.” Moreover, “it
is often extremely difficult to prove the criminal intent of the
executives.” The authors conclude that
while public pressure may compel more prosecutions of high-ranking financial
officials responsible for the financial crisis, it is “equally likely” that the
reversal in Ferguson may discourage prosecutors from acting.
The
public is justifiably upset. However, as
U.S. v. Ferguson demonstrates, the
chance for failure in cases involving complex securities fraud is a big
disincentive. The other challenge the
government faces is that the people they would prosecute can afford the best
representation money can buy. Financial
Fraud Law recently reported
that one big D.C. based firm has gone so far as to establish its own “Financial
Fraud Enforcement Task Force” to counter the Obama Administration’s Enforcement
Task Force that was established over two years ago. To add, prosecutors face many of their former
colleagues who have recently jumped to the private sector to, presumably, cash
in on their experience as prosecutors by representing the people that could be
the target of the government’s efforts.
Financial Fraud Law has documented
the transfer of state and federal financial fraud prosecutors to private firms
specializing in white collar criminal defense.
This all goes to show that the obstacles prosecutors face are substantial. While we should not let the government off
the hook for holding those accountable who committed fraud, we can at least
understand why it may take longer than we would like for justice to be
served.
Ted
Serafini
Blogger,
Criminal Law Brief
Image by wblj
Great Post!
ReplyDeleteYour comments about the difficulty of proving criminal intent tend to suggest that a new negligence standard should be created where if you cannot prove the elements of a crime, at least penalties can be brought against the company. Do you know what, if anything, Dodd-Frank did to that effect?