Lafler
was charged with assault with intent to murder, possession of a firearm by a
felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor
possession of marijuana and for being a habitual offender after an incident
that took place on March 25, 2003, where Lafler repeatedly fired a gun at Kali
Mundy. Lafler did not refute that
he in fact committed the crime, and initially expressed interest in a plea
bargain. However, upon the advice
from his counsel, Lafler refused the prosecution’s offer to dismiss two of the
charges and recommend a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months for the
remaining charges. Lafler’s
attorney convinced him that since Lafler’s shots fired at Mundy only hit her
below the waist, in the buttock, hip, and abdomen, he could not be convicted of
assault with intent to murder under Michigan law. Lafler, who chose to proceed forward with his trial, was
convicted by the jury on all counts, and received a mandatory minimum sentence
of 185 to 360 months in prison.
When
Lafler subsequently brought a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
state court, his claim was denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals also rejected Lafler’s claim,
reasoning that despite the defendant’s post-conviction qualms with his
attorney, the defendant knowingly rejected the plea and opted to be heard by a
trial of his peers. The Michigan
Supreme Court refused to hear Lafler’s appeal.
The
defendant then appealed to the federal system. Beginning in the district court with a petition for federal
habeas relief, the defendant found relief when the court ruled that the
Michigan Court of Appeals misinterpreted the standards of ineffective
assistance of counsel enumerated in Strickland v. Washington. The district court instructed that the
defendant should be sentenced according to the original plea offer, with a
minimum sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s ruling, and the Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari.
The
majority opinion, for which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
joined, held that to be eligible for relief, the defendant must show that but
for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
the court would have accepted the plea offer. Additionally, the conviction, sentence, or both must be less
severe under the plea offer than under the judgment and sentence rendered by
trial.
Finally,
the Court clarified the proper remedy for ineffective advice that results in a
trial and sentence with increased sentencing. Instead of directly instituting the plea-bargain, as the district
court did, the Court held that the prosecution should only be required to
re-offer the original plea. This
gives the defendant the proper opportunity to accept the plea but leaves the
ultimate decision to the court as to whether to accept the plea. The court is justified in either
accepting the plea to assign the defendant the lesser sentence, upholding the
sentence that resulted from the prejudiced jury trial, or decreeing a new
sentence that takes into account both the plea offer and the trial.
Critics of the majority opinion are distinguishing Lafler
and Frye on the basis that unlike Frye, Lafler received the full benefit of
having his case tried fairly in front of a jury of his peers, which is the
constitutional right the Sixth Amendment purports to protect. Lafler, therefore, could not have been
prejudiced if his right to a fair trial was recognized and fulfilled. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
this reasoning, explaining that the right to effective assistance of counsel
must extend to all the critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including
pretrial stages that may involve plea-bargaining. The Court asserted that a fair trial goes beyond merely
ensuring a conviction’s reliability and extends to providing a fair process for
the defendant.
Ali Eacho
Blogger, Criminal
Law BriefImage by S.E.B.
I find the implications on how differently state and federal courts handle procedural matters particularly interesting in this case. The procedural history indicates that all levels of the Michigan courts were unwilling to compromise for a poor, black defendant. However, federal courts seemed to more readily recall that evidence is intended to be read in the light most favorable to the defendant, no matter his social background. I wonder what this ruling will do for poor, uneducated defendants who don't necessarily receive the best representation available. Hopefully it represents a new age of understanding in the courtroom; however, I can't help but wonder if it will make any significant difference in how individual jurisdictions will rule on identical cases.
ReplyDeleteAmanda, I completely agree with your conflicted reaction to the Court's decision. On one hand it's refreshing to see a ruling that would seem to implicate greater protections for criminal defendants. On the other hand, we see the Court giving lower courts a great deal of discretion when a violation occurs in determining whether to reinstate the original plea offer or to adopt the sentence from the trial court. I think this broad power bestowed upon lower court judges to determine sentences probably reflects the compromise that took place between the Supreme Court Justices when deciding the case, especially since this ended up a 5-4 decision. Given the compromise, I too am skeptical of the actual effects this decision will have on the criminal justice system as a whole.
ReplyDeleteCooper was the one charged not lafler..
ReplyDelete